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I. INTRODUCTION
The Army currently does not have an explicit lease
versus buy methodology when establishing the financial
arrangements in the procurement of assets. The method of
financing is often decided after a cost-benefit analysis
has already determined which of several candidate items are
to be procured to fill a specific need.
It is the intent of this thesis to propose a workable
lease versus buy methodology that can be an inherent part
of a cost-benefit analysis and not just a separate, and
partial, evaluation. The thesis will examine current prac-
tices, lease versus buy models, elements of the lease versus
buy decision, and an example showing the attributes of the
proposed methodology. The purpose of the methodology is
to provide the Army manager with objective guidelines to
maximize the utilization of his budget in a lease versus
buy situation.

II. LEASE VERSUS BUY OVERVIEW
Private Industry
Wall Street is giving leasing firms a good deal of
respect these days because of their high profitability.
A popular example is the automobile leasing business in
which firms such as Hertz and Avis rental car companies
predominate. It is estimated that these firm's leasing
business is growing at approximately ten to fifteen percent
annually. Itel Corporation is another well known firm which
recently reported raising over one billion dollars of credit
in order to buy and then lease heavy equipment ranging from
containerships to jet aircraft.
Long term leasing, normally for periods of two or more
years, should not be confused with rental which is normally
for a much shorter period of time at a higher daily rate and
is used to satisfy a short term requirement. The question
of whether to lease or buy any particular asset has been
debated continually. In private industry, leasing is a
widely used method of securing the use of important assets.
However, in private industry, leasing is made more attrac-
tive by tax differences between leasing (in which all outlays
are considered expenses) and owning (in which only a portion
of the cost of the equipment can be expensed in any given
year in the form of depreciation)
.

From the financial and accounting point of view, the
unique feature of a leasing contract is that although the
lessee is entitled to the use of the asset, legal title is
retained by the lessor, who continues to own it. Leasing
is an alternative method of financing ownership. Under
present accounting conventions, the user of the property
cannot show it among his assets, and the periodic obligations
to pay rent are not shown as liabilities until they become
due. Thus arises the term of
f
-the-balance - sheet financing .
However, one must remember that the value of the property
appears on the balance sheet of the lessor, who is the
holder of the legal title.
There are basically two classes of leases - the service
lease and the financial lease. The service lease or opera-
ting lease includes both financing and maintenance services.
International Business Machines is one of the initiators of
this type contract with regard to computers, together with
the automobile and truck rental agencies. One of the two
characteristics of this type lease is that frequently the
payments required under the initial lease contract are not
sufficient to recover the full cost of the equipment. In
this case, the lessor expects to recover his cost in subse-
quent renewal payments. The other characteristic of the
service lease is the fact that such leases frequently con-
tain a cancellation clause giving the lessee the right to
cancel the lease and return the equipment before the expira-
tion of the basic lease agreement. This fact is an important

one for the lessee in that he can return lease equipment
2if technological developments render it obsolete.
The financial lease has two distinguishing character-
istics. The first is the fixed nature of the obligation.
Whenever a lease is noncancellable and runs over a long
period of time, it produces a financial burden on the lessee
similar to that of a debt. Second, under a financial lease,
a lessee promises payments which, in total, exceed the pur-
chase price of the assets that are leased. In analyzing a
balance sheet, we consider the payments under a long-term
lease arrangement to be in the same category as the servicing
of a bond issue. However, in case of default of a lease
contract, the lessor may repossess his property, but in
bankruptcy his claim for damages may not exceed one year's
future rent if a liquidation results from the failure, or
three years' rent if the company undergoes reorganization,
3
no matter how long the lease had to run.
In some cases the borrowing capacity of a firm can be
increased by raising funds through leases rather than
direct debt. One of these factors is that the title to
leased property remains in the control of the lessor. It
can not be touched by the creditors of the lessee. In
fact if the property can be expected always to have a value
to others, a lease may be the only way a financially
embarrassed corporation can obtain the use of new equipment.
It should be noted though that the more the leased property

becomes special purpose, the more the general credit of
the company limits its power either to lease or to borrow.
A second factor that may sometimes permit a company to
raise more funds by lease rather than by debt is that the
burdens the lease creates are not evidenced by liabilities
on the balance sheet. The results may be that certain
grantors of credit will not take the leasehold obligations
fully into account and thus be more willing to grant credit
if the equivalent debt were to appear on the balance sheet.
Although there is evidence to support this situation, the
FASB published in November 19 76 in Statement of Financial
Accounting Standards No. 13 (SFAS 13) : Accounting for Leases
that leases should not be excluded from disclosure require-
ments and should be consistent with the information presently
required with respect to owned property and long-term
obligations.
The reduction of tax payments is often a reason that
makes a lease arrangement desirable from both the lessee's
and lessor's point of view. The investment tax credit in
effect can be used for tax avoidance purposes and to limit
the maximum percentage of a corporation's tax liability if
that corporation purchases a capital asset. If, however, a
firm cannot use this tax credit, the leasing of assets can
then transfer an outlay subject to tax credits to the books
of a company that has not reached its tax limit, with the
parties splitting the lump-sum tax loss to the government.
Not to be forgotten is the fact that leasing can also make
10

offsetting changes in the time profiles of taxable income
for the parties. This circumstance made leasing very
attractive to leasees in the 1930 's largely because the
lease would permit a far more favorable schedule of tax
shields than was available to owners under the then existing
laws and regulations. However, today, with the advent of
different depreciable life spans, a firm that desires to own
an asset may select a scheme of depreciation with heavy
charges in early years. Thus, it is much less likely that
a lease will offer tax shield advantages solely without
consideration of other aspects of the lease versus buy
decision.
The following is a list of generally accepted advantages
of lease rather than ownership from an operations and budget-
ing point of view. As will be obvious upon inspection, most
apply to the government sector as well.
a. Fixed monthly payments permit accurate prediction
of cash needs
.
b. Typically no down payment is required.
c. Unlike a bank loan, no compensating balances are
required thus conserving cash.
d. Because the lessor's financial interest is presumed
to be secured by the equipment itself, a lease transaction
does not necessarily give the lessor power to restrict
other financing by the firm.
11

e. Because leases are treated as operating, rather
than capital, expenses, middle managers with some discre-
tion about expenses can make lease deals rapidly without
needing the approval of corporate headquarters
.
f. Because the capital appropriations process is so
complex in many big companies and in government, especially
in the middle of a year, unplanned purchasing is very diffi-
cult. Leasing cuts through this problem.
g. If the government begins a tight money policy, a
company can negotiate leases instead of debt financing
although this move may be a destabilizing influence in
regard to government aims.
In an evaluation of the lease versus buy decision, firms
must also take into account the important yet vague areas
of risk, discount rate, method of lease versus buy evalua-
tion, and salvage value in order to conclude a rational
decision. A detailed discussion of these areas, both
theoretical and practical, will follow in succeeding
chapters
.
Surveys of the leasing industry indicate a wide diverg-
ence of practices. This circumstance is a probable conse-
quence of the fact that the field of finance has not yet
developed a consensus in regards to a lease versus purchase
model. For example, Sorensen and Johnson conducted a survey
of some 520 retail financial lease contracts from four non-
bank retail firms. These contracts on different categories
of equipment were studied and descriptive material relating

to asset costs, asset types, maturities, prepayments,
collateral, default remedies, and treatment of the invest-
ment tax credit were generated. The following conclusions
were reached.
a. Financial leases take advantage of the liquidity
of funds invested in easily traded equipment, and transfer
the uncertainty over residual values to those best informed
about resale markets.
b. Lessors reduce the weight of their risk-bearing
functions by diversifying across equipment types, customers,
and regions.
c. Profitable trade between firms in the leasing con-
tract seems to be due only in a small part to reduced tax
^ 8payments
.
d. Firms have been able to set prices on the basis of
high target rates of return. However, there is strong
evidence of competitive erosion because of recent changes
in accounting practices and rebates to equipment manufac-
turers. This survey on costs quoted implied cost rates
averaging 24.98 and 18.69 percent on before and after tax
(50 percent) basis respectively on contracts no larger
than $200,000.
e. In larger firms, this survey indicated that although
multiple hurdle rates were used to adjust for risk differ-
entials among projects in capital budgeting programs, few
respondents to the survey employ lease models which attempt

to adjust for risk differentials in the lease-purchase
cash flows.
f. Implementation problems involving the appropriate
discount rate for each of several types of cash flows in
a decision process and the determination of the optimal
debt level for the purchase option in regards to the amount
of debt capacity displaced by the lease seem to bias many
of the lease versus buy models used by industry toward the
lease option.
Government
In government budgeting, managers are concerned with
two sources of funds - the operations and maintenance fund
and the procurement fund. In the Army the operation and
maintenance appropriation funding structure has tended to
mask the total cost of the equipment from the army manager.
The purchase cost of equipment under the ownership option
is borne by a procurement appropriation, while the cost of
operating and maintaining the equipment is borne by the
operations and maintenance appropriation. The army manager
tends to address only the operations and maintenance side
of the cost picture and not to consider the initial costs
incurred in procurement nor the salvage value dollars returned
to the government upon disposal of the equipment. In essence
sharp reductions in procurement funding in recent years has
led army managers to lease needed equipment by allocating
T Q
costs to the operations and maintenance funds. "^
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III. DISCOUNT RATE DETERMINATION
A major factor in the lease versus buy decision is the
timing of the costs and benefits in the cash flow. Typically,
purchasing requires the immediate incurrence of a one time
initial cost whereas leasing would involve a series of
smaller periodic costs which would be greater than the one-
time cost of the purchase decision. The time difference
cannot be merely summed and compared because to do so would
imply that money has equal value regardless of the timing
of its receipt. If the above were the case, purchasing
would clearly be the choice over lease in all situations,
assuming no taxes.
Time value of money makes a difference to the decision
maker. An investor will consider the fact that a dollar
received now is of greater value than a dollar received
one year hence. The reason is that a dollar received now
can earn interest whereby that dollar one year from now
is worth to the investor some value greater than our original
dollar. With this reasoning in mind, it may be that leasing
can in some cases be considered less costly than purchase,
even without differential tax treatments.
Thus, it is important to determine the opportunity
cost of the money involved in the lease versus buy trans-
action. In each decision the analyst must determine both
the category and magnitude of costs to be incurred and the
16

time period over which those costs will be incurred. Two
cost streams are developed, one representing the buy
decision and the other representing the lease decision.
In order to compare these streams, a single value must be
ascertained at a certain point in time - usually that point
in time that the lease versus buy decision will be made.
This procedure is known as calculating the present value of
the costs or discounting the costs. The present value of
each cost is summed according to the stream in which that
cost occurs. The result is the total present value costs
of the lease stream and the buy stream.
When the calculations are performed, the discount rate
should be that value which best reflects the time value of
money of the decision maker performing the analysis. The
results will indicate that the present value of a future cost
will be smaller as the time period of the investment is
increased, assuming the discount rate is held constant.
Also of interest is the fact that as the discount rate is
increased, the discounted cost of the investment will be
smaller, assuming a fixed period of time. Discount tables
are available in most economic and accounting texts
.
The previous discussion is only a basic illustrative
framework for calculating the necessary cost streams in the
lease versus buy decisions. The actual opportunity cost
used by industry and government is more difficult to obtain.
Two widely used methods used by industry are now described

as a preface to eventually determining more adequate
government discount rate policy.
The more traditional theory of the two methods states
that a firm's cost of capital depends upon the mixture of
equity and debt financing the firm uses as the basis for
its financial policies. Using an example presented in
Dopuch and Birnberg, suppose that a firm has assets
of $10,000, all of which are financed by common stock.
Suppose also that the assets earn 10% and the stock sells
at a price to yield 10%. The result is that the direct
cost of obtaining equity capital is measured by this 10%.
However, if the firm now borrows an additional $5000 at a
4% interest rate but yields a 10% rate of return, 4% is
considered to measure the direct cost of obtaining debt
capital. The average cost of capital then would be a
weighted averaged of 8%, i.e., 2/3(10%) + 1/3(4%) = 8%.
If another $5000 were to be borrowed under similar condi-
tions, the average cost of capital would be 7%, i.e.,
1/2(10%) + 1/2(4%) =7%. In this case the average cost
of capital would decrease as the debt-to - stock equity ratio
increases
.
However, the interest rate or the rate on equity, or
both, would be expected to eventually increase as investors
realized that there is a "safe" limit on the amount of debt
a firm can support on a given amount of equity capital.
Obviously, the average cost of capital would then be expected
18

to rise. The rate on equity capital and the rate on
interest are considered to be constant up to the point
where they increase to reflect the higher risk to bond
holders and stockholders associated with high debt-to-
stock equity ratios. (See figure 3-1.)
At an equilibrium point or the minimum point on the
average cost-of-capital curve, the following formula was
derived:
i^ = P + (B/S) (P - r^)
where
P = average cost of capital to the firm.
i = rate of return to stockholders.
e
r, = rate of interest paid to bondholders.
S = total market value of the stocks outstanding
B = total market value of the bonds outstanding.
The above formula states that if the decision maker assumes
that the firm maintains a constant B/S ratio, the average
cost-of-capital rate will remain constant. The assumptions
here are no-growth, a constant pattern of assets, a constant
set of preferences in the market place, etc. At this point
the marginal cost of capital will equal the average cost-
of-capital rate. The firm will then make investment deci-
sions based on a balance between debt and equity capital in

Figure 3-1
Cost of capital as a function of debt-to-equity ratios,
i = rate on equity capital; P = average cost of capital;
r, = rate on debt; E = stock equity; B/E = long term debt


















an optimal mix. It is, then, this discount rate that a
decision maker would use to evaluate his lease versus buy
, . . 2decision.
A more recent theory concerns the behavior of the
average cost of capital rate and the rate on equity stock.
The underlying premise is that a firm's cost of capital
is strictly a function of the risk due to the types of
assets the firm holds. Thus, there is a cost of capital, P,
which is dependent on the risk class of the firm. The
method of financing the assets does not change the cost
of capital rate. For example, if a firm increases its
debt to finance its investments, the risk to stockholders
is increased in that holding a stock of an unlevered firm




The newer theory measures the after tax discount rate
as
P* = (1 - t(B/V) )P^
where
P* = after tax discount rate.
t = marginal tax rate.
B/V = ratio of debt to total equity.




Constant costs of capital as debt-to-equity (B/E)
increases. i = rate on equity capital; P = average
cost of capital; r, = rate on debt; E = stock equity;




P^ = (X/V) (1 - t)
where
X = expected average earnings from a given set
of assets
.
V = total market value of the firm.
The main difference between the two theories is in the
effect of debt upon the firm's average cost of capital rate
up to the equilibrium point. The fact that there are two
theories on the effect of financing policies on the cost
of capital of a firm implies that it is difficult to verify
empirically either of these theories. The most favorable
one will probably be the one with the most intuitive appeal
The newer theory which is often referred to as the "M and
M" theory in honor of its authors, Modigliani and Miller,
3
seems to be the widely accepted one.
Discount rate determination for evaluation of public
projects is generally more difficult to compute than the
one for private industry. However, this chore must be
performed if an efficient allocation of resources is to be
realized either among government projects or between govern-
ment projects and private industry projects. To make any
sense of a model which helps solve the lease versus buy
dilemma in the Army, an appropriate discount rate must be
calculated.

The government issues debt in several forms. The most
recognizable to the average consumer is the bond. When a
consiimer voluntarily purchases a bond which returns , for
example, six percent, he is indicating that this rate of
return compensates him for giving up a dollar's worth of
present consumption. Thus, an observer can determine bounds
on the opportunity cost by noting the consumer's acceptance
of the rate of interest on government bonds by that con-
sumer's willingness to purchase those bonds. Also, logically,
one can state that those who do not own bonds must consider
their opportunity cost to be greater than the aforementioned
six percent.
The opportunity cost of resources derived from industry
follows somewhat the same argument. With a corporation tax
rate near fifty percent, low profit ceiling utilities are
expected by their regulatory agencies to yield five to eight
percent after taxes or some twelve percent before taxes.
Most other industries must earn more in order to prosper.
The conclusion that one reaches from the above is that
a proposed discount rate must take into account that resources
taken from a bondholding consumer have as a lower range an
opportunity cost of the interest rate on current government
bonds. On resources which are kept from non-bondholding
consumers or from business firms, the opportunity cost
4
should be higher.
Specifically, Raymond F. Mikesell's The Rate of Discount
for Evaluating Public Projects believes that

Although the rate of discount for evalua-
ting public projects should be based on the
opportunity cost of capital in the private
sector, the comparable rate of return in the
private sector should be the before-tax rate
of return on projects in the same risk class.
There may, of course, be no category of
private investment comparable to certain types
of investment in the public sector. In this
case, the best approach might be to employ the
rate of interest on long-term government
securities adjusted for the corporate income
tax, plus an allowance for risk determined
on the basis of probability coefficients for
benefits and costs appropriate to the particu-
lar project to be evaluted.-'
Jacob A. Stockfisch's article The Interest Rate Applicable
to Government Investment Projects estimated a rate of return
measured on the "marginal efficiency of investment". He
also believes that the rate of return should be calculated
before taxes because the government shares in the yield from
private investment. In particular government investment
projects cause a loss of tax yields when resources are
diverted from the private sector. For example, Stockfisch
points out that an increment of private investment of $100
million may increase the net national product by $15 million
annually. A 50 percent tax rate yields the government
$7.5 million of that increment. The overall social benefit
of the private investment is thus fifteen percent and thus
should be the rate of return used to evaluate government
investment projects.
The implied equilibrium from a standard rate of return
does, of course, not exist principally because of individual
investor's perception of risk on different type assets. The

government, thus, is forced to use some average of marginal
rates of return in order to obtain an overall measure of
the social benefits of private investment. Stockfisch
confronted this problem by noting the average rate of return
in manufacturing industries to be approximately fifteen
percent and the rate of return in the regulated industries
to be approximately ten percent. This survey was valid for
the period 1951-65. He thus concluded that these rates
appeared to be reasonable estimates of the opportunity cost
of private investment in those sectors. He further weighted
the flows of capital from the two sectors at 70 percent and
30 percent respectively. The weighted average yielded a
13.5 percent overall rate of return. This overall rate, he
argued, would be an acceptable discount rate for government
projects
.
Elmer B. Staats, Comptroller General of the United States
in 196 8, presented a different method from the previous ones
in calculating a discount rate in a Report to the Joint
Economic Committee, U.S. Congress, January 29, 196 8. He
stated that if Treasury borrowing costs are calculated on
the basis of total costs to the government, including
corporate and individual income taxes foregone as a result
of borrowing by the government to finance programs, an
estimate of between seven and eight percent would result.





Illustration of Calculation of Total Cost to the
Government of Borrowed Funds
^
Method 1
The current interest cost of borrowing long-term money is
approximately 5 percent. The moving average rate specified
by Senate Document 97 is currently about 3.2 percent.
Therefore, a rate of interest approximately halfway between
5.0 and 3.2 percent could be used for initial consideration
as the Government cost of borrowed money.*
Add to this cost:
4.0'
1. Corporate taxes foregone by the Government if the
average corporate return on investment is 12 percent before
taxes, if the fraction of dollars borrowed by the Government
which would have gone into corporate investment is 6 5
percent, and if the marginal corporate tax rate is 40 percent.
(.12) (.65) (.4) 3.1%
2. Personal taxes foregone by the Government if the
average return on proprietorship, personal income-producing
investments, etc., is such that the remaining 35 percent
of money borrowed by the Government would have earned a 10
percent return for the persons taxed and if such a return
would be taxed at a composite marginal rate of 30 percent.
(.1) (.35) (.3) 1.0%
3. (a) Taxes foregone by the Government of dividends that
would have been received by individuals from corporations
if the composite marginal tax rate applicable to individuals
is 30 percent, if the taxable dividends payout is 40 percent
of corporate earnings and the marginal tax rate shown above
under (1) are applicable. The marginal corporate tax rate
is assumed to be 40 percent, therefore 60 percent of
corporate earnings is assumed available to the corporation
for payment of dividends.
(.3) (.4) (.12) (.65) (.6) = .6%
(b) Personal taxes foregone by the Government if the
corporate investment is financed by bonds rather than by
corporate earnings, if corporate bonds carry an interest
rate of 5 percent, if the fraction of dollars borrowed by
* Note that these rates of interest are from 1969 data.

the Government which would have gone into corporate invest-
ment is 6 5 percent, and if the composite marginal tax
rate applicable to individuals is 30 percent.
(.05) (.65) (.3) = 1.0%
(c) Actual overall financing arrangements by corpora-
tions will generate tax revenues under both (a) and (b)
.
therefore the cost to the Government may be assumed to be
somewhere between .6 percent and 1.0 percent, say about .8'
Subtract from this cost:
1. Income taxes collected on Government interest payments,
if investments in bonds (see rate above of 4 percent) are
divided between corporations and individuals in such a way
that the tax rate is 35 percent.
(.04) (.35) -1.4'
Cost to Government 7.5%
Method 2
On an aggregate basis, a similar result may be computed
assuming a composite corporate and personal marginal tax
rate of 50 percent and a taxable return of 10 percent on
any money not borrowed by the Government.
(.5) (.1) 5.0%
Cost of Government borrowing (see explanation under
Method 1) 4.0%
Less taxes if Government bond interest (.04) (.35)
(see explanation under Method 1) -1.4%
Cost to Government 7.6%

In practice the Department of Defense has been mandated
to recognize the timing of cash-flows by the required use
of discounting techniques. An overall rate of ten percent
has been stated as a rate which reflects the preference for
current and future money sacrifices that the public exhibits
in non-government transactions . This prescribed rate is
supposed to represent an estimate of the average rate of
return on private investment before corporate taxes and
g
after adjusting for inflation.
As stated previously, especially in chapter three,
the discount rate plays an important role in the lease
versus buy decision. The above illustrations as to a
calculation of a representative discount rate for the
present year yields the observation that the DOD mandated
rate may indeed be too low.
^
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IV. WIDELY ACCEPTED LEASE VERSUS BUY MODELS
Paul F. Anderson and John D. Martin conducted a survey
of the top Fortune 2 00 firms in order to determine the methods
used in a lease versus buy decision. The survey indicated
that the companies depended on the traditional internal
rate of return (IRR) model, the conventional net present
value (NPV) model, a variant to the Weston and Brigham
model (1972), and a variant to the Bower, Herringer, and
Williamson model.
Before examining these different models, note the
following notation and their meaning.
- A = cash purchase price of the asset.
^ R. = lease payment required in year i.
^D. = depreciation charge for year i allowed for tax
purposes.
I. = interest on a loan or loan equivalent in year i.
II
I. = Bower, Herringer, and Williamson model method of
computing the equivalent loan in year i.
V-
.
= total pre-tax cash operating costs expected to
occur in year i if the firm purchases the asset but not if
the asset is leased.
V = expected after-tax salvage value of the asset
at the end of year n.





n = useful economic life of the asset in years.
i ^ t = corporate average and marginal tax rate on
ordinary income.
• t = investment tax credit rate,
c
K = after tax weighted average cost of capital for
the firm..
\r = pre-tax interest rate on intermediate-term debt




= after-tax cost of leasing (IRR model).
^ NAL = the NPV advantage of the lease.
See figure 4-1 for a table of commonality of elements of
the lease versus buy models under discussion.
NPV Model
The conventional NPV model can be stated as follows.
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From the above observe that an investment proposal's NPV
is derived by discounting the cash receipts to their present
values and summing them over the life of the proposal. One
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and there exists perfect certainty as to the elements of
the above equation. Then, the decision rules will be that
when NPV is greater than zero, we lease the project and
when the NPV is less than zero, we buy the project. The
present values are calculated using a discount cost which
reflects the alternative use of capital, i.e., the oppor-
tunity cost which under certainty would be the riskless
rate of interest. Thus, these decision rules should, under
the assumed conditions, result in an optimal choice of
projects that can be found which will increase the value
of the firm.
IRR Model
The traditional IRR model is another time-discounted
measure of investment worth. As applied to the lease versus
buy decision, the equation is as follows.
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From the above equation, the IRR is defined as that rate
of discount which equates the present value of the stream
of net receipts with the initial outlay. The decision rules
2for the IRR model are the following.

a. Lease if the IRR exceeds the after-tax weighted
average cost of capital for the firro.
b. Buy if the IRR is less than the after-tax weighted
average cost of capital for the firm.
From the above two models, observe that if a buy
decision is reached through the NPV criterion, the buy
decision will also be reached by the IRR criterion, and
vice versa. If the lease versus buy decision is not a
separate decision from the decision as to whether to under-
take a project, one must examine and evaluate the incre-
mental cash flows at the firm's cost of capital. Then, the
NPV method insures that the firm will reach the optimal
scale of investment and is established in terms of a percen-
tage rather than in terms of absolute dollars. However, one
should be careful to note that despite the fact that both
the NPV and IRR models result in the same lease and buy
decisions, this equivalence does not necessarily hold for
the ranking of investment proposals. This same problem
arises in traditional capital budgeting decisions among
mutually exclusive choice situations.
Also, assumptions as to reinvestment rates further
differentiate between IRR and NPV in the lease versus buy
decision. The reinvestment rate is the time-discounting
process that underlies both the NPV and IRR methods. In
the NPV method it is assumed that all receipts can be rein-
vested at the firm's opportunity cost of capital or the firm's
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alternative use of funds. On the other hand, the IRR
method assumes reinvestment at the project's rate of return.
This latter assumption, however, has no economic basis
since the alternative cost of capital may not be the pro-
ject's rate of return and the after-tax weighted average
cost of capital for the firm at the same time. The first
reason the above could not occur is that high-return projects
in the future may not be available as they are today. The
second reason is that even if such projects were available,
these projects will always be executed by a firm whose cost
of capital is equal to K in the NPV model independent of
the decision on the current project under consideration.
Thus, it is in error to credit the current project with any
future benefits accruing from the reinvestment of the interim
proceeds at rates of return above K in the NPV model.
Therefore, in deciding which lease versus buy model to use,
one must remember that the NPV method provides an optimal
solution to the generalized capital budgeting problem given
the assumption that future cash flows and the appropriate
cost of capital are known. Both the NPV and IRR are weighted
averages where the former method uses the appropriate short-
term weights: K,, K^ / •••/ K while the latter method uses
3the inappropriate long-term rate of return P.
Lump Sum Loan Model
The third method of lease versus buy to be considered
is the Lump Sum Loan model.
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This method assumes that the firm's objective is to maximize
its wealth and takes into consideration the lease-loan
decision. Again, K, is a weighted average cost of capital
for the firm and the rate of return that a firm's investors
expect. K also can be applied to basic cash flows asso-
ciated with leasing to discover how the market value of
the firm will be affected by the lease choice. Thus, the
operating advantage of the lease can be measured. The non-
cancellable claims included in the lease agreement can be
capitalized at the rate that applies to debt. This rate
is designated r and is used to determine the market value
of the lease- Thus, the financial advantage of the lease
is the difference between the market value of the lease and
the loan that could replace that lease.
The model takes the rates K and r as well as the optimal
mix of debt and equity and relates them all to the risk in
the firm's flows. According to the authors, the proper
assumption is that a lease payment schedule of any configura-
tion can be matched by a loan or series of loans with the
same configuration. Thus, we adjsut for our uncertainty
by adjusting K. and r.
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Also, of note is the fact that I. is calculated as





X = purchase price of the loan,
V2 - ^^(i-1) - ^(i-2)^) for i = 2 to i = n








The market value of the lease is defined as the sum of the
lease payments discounted at the loan rate. The market
value of the alternative loan is equal to the purchase price
4
of the equipment that the loan would finance.
The final decision will dictate that we lease if the




The last model to be considered is the Annual Installment
model.
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This model also takes into account the burden of financing
a purchase if buy is the final decision in the lease versus
buy decision. The first term on the right hand side of the
equation differs from the first term of the right hand side
of the equation in the Lump Sum Loan model in that the
former assumes annual installments repaid whereas the latter
considers a lump sum loan purchase in the first year. The
rest of the equation's elements are fairly straight forward
except for the following two points. Note first of all that
I. is computed directly from the loan payment for period i
instead of the more complicated method in the Bower,
Herringer, and Williamson model. Note also that all ele-
ments, except salvage value considerations, in the Annual
Installment model are discounted to the firm's after-tax
debt rather than the after-tax weighted average cost of
capital for the firm which appears in the Lump Sum Loan
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model and the conventional NPV model. According to Weston
and Brigham, in comparing two financial alternatives there
is essentially no risk to the firm in obtaining the savings
attributable to one alternative over the other. If this
be the case, then, a discount rate that reflects the low
risk is preferable to one that reflects the firm's average
risk.
A positive NAL result indicates that it is cheaper to
lease rather than buy, and a negative result indicates
that it is cheaper for the firm to borrow and purchase
rather than to lease.
Survey Findings
a. The survey found that seventy percent of the firms
used the IRR model and the NPV model.
b. The remaining survey respondents admitted to using
variations of the Weston and Brigham model and the Bower,
Herringer , and Williamson model.
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Some organizations use payback analysis in their every-
day lease versus buy decisions. The following discussion
of this much maligned method is undertaken as a basic
building block to the understanding of the lease versus buy
subject.
The payback period is defined as a measure of the time
it will take to recover the original investment from the
resultant improvement in cash flows from earnings or savings.
Firms that use this method establish a minimum acceptable
payback period, e.g., such as a three year period. This
period would then be the accept-re ject criterion. If a
firm then determined that an initial investment on a project
will be recovered sometime in the fourth year of the project's
life, the proposed project would fail to meet the established
test.
Obviously, then, what this criterion does is favor
those projects which return the largest benefits in the
early years relative to the initial outlay. This result
is desirable; however, weaknesses occur because this method
fails to discriminate as to the timing of the cash flows
and fails to account for the benefits which lie beyond the
payback period. Thus, the payback criterion is not in fact
a true measure of profitability.
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Although payback analysis has declined relative to
time-adjusted methods in capital budgeting, this method is
still widely used in both industry and government. Familiar-
i ity, simplicity, and apparent objectivity are reasons for
this consideration. Although the aforementioned criticisms
do exist, they are diminished in importance if the compari-
sons of alternatives are among a family of investment oppor-
tunities having roughly the same economic life and profile
of benefits. Thus, there is a rough similarity with the true
profitability established in the time-adjusted method in
that both methods favor high cash flows in the early years.
However, it is not wise to assume that a firm would accept
an investment proposal that promised to return solely the
initial investment. Thus, in practice a firm using the
payback criterion would probably make a qualitative rather
than quantitative decision regarding the cash flow in the
years following the payback cutoff.
Of further interest to the firm that is making capital
budgeting decisions is the fact that the payback period can
under certain circumstances provide a rough estimate of
the investment proposal's rate of profit. Note, from our
definition of the payback period, that the reciprocal of
the payback period (K = 1/payback period) is the reciprocal
estimate of the rate of orofit. Therefore,




k = the proposal's expected rate of profit.
S = the earnings or savings before depreciation
that the proposal is expected to provide
in the year t.
C = the cost of the proposal.
n = the number of years the equipment is expected
to last.
Then from our net present value formula,
r = 1 S, 1 ,n
K " K^l + K^







From the above equation, the second term approaches zero
as n, the life of the proposal, becomes infinitely large.
The above results yield the following conclusions.
a. If an equipment proposal will earn or save the
same annual amount forever, its rate of profit is simply
the reciprocal of its payback period.
b. If the equipment will last a finite number of years,
the rate of profit is at most the reciprocal of the payback
period and smaller by the quantity S/C(l+k) .
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Myron J. Gordon developed the above reasoning. Gordon
also determined that the project life which yields extremely
small errors between the true rate of profit and the pay-
back reciprocal estimate of the rate of profit is two or
three years greater than twice the payback period in a
before tax situation. Further study also indicated that in
regards to tax and depreciation considerations, the payback
reciprocal estimate is a good estimate of the true rate of
profitability for a project life above the post tax payback
period.
After all the above factors have been considered, the
final justification for using payback analysis probably
lies in the realm of risk reduction rather than just profita-
bility analysis. Many firms have little faith in mid-term
and longer projections of the future. The payback analysis
is in essence a crude measure of risk. If a firm has little
confidence in demand forecasts, capital expenditure program
projections, etc., there will be a natural inclination to
measure the time it will take for an investment to return
the original outlay in relation to some near-term payback
criterion. Thus, indeed, the payback standard can be con-
sidered as a rough measure of the level of confident
judgment.
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The lease is a contract which separates the possibility
to use the property from its ownership for the period of the
lease. The contract dictates that at the expiration of
the lease, the property is returned to the lessor together
with all permanent improvements installed by the lessee.
One argument favoring ownership over leasing that is
frequently heard is that the values that will exist at the
end of a lease contract are too great to surrender. For
example, real estate is a certain type of property that
usually enjoys a high sale value at the time the lease
expires and, consequently, it may be desirable to hold
title for the purpose of gaining from this residual value.
However, we must take into consideration the fact that money
which may be received in the distant future has far less
value in the present than its future amount makes it seem
to have
.
In everyday practice, though, the possibility of sub-
stantial end of life capital value is frequently overlooked
by decision makers in the lease versus buy appraisal. The
following factors probably can be attributed to this
omission.
a. Economic life is frequently so long and ultimate
dollar realization so far distant that these future values
have very little effect on present investment decisions.
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b. The probable residual is sometimes so low that it
can safely be ignored.
c. The available data on the asset to be considered
for use does not provide an adequate base for forecasting.
d. The future is so uncertain that changing conditions
may wipe out whatever values seem probable once the economic
decision has been made.
Residual values or terminal values have more meaning
than the term salvage value implies. Terminal values include
everything that produces or retains a cash or opportunity
cost value at the time the physical facilities contem-
plated in the lease versus buy proposal are retired or
replaced. The value is usually positive in amount but
sometimes may be negative.
Some items in which terminal values play a significant
role are, as mentioned above, real estate whereby lease-
back arrangements often carry relatively low interest
charges, partly because the lessor forecasts an increase
in the value of the land included in the lease-back package.
Also of importance in lease versus buy decisions are resale
values of used buildings and machinery which is thought of
more conventionally as salvage value. Another source of
value that is sometimes overlooked, usually because its
original cost is occasionally not included in the initial
investment outlay, is the firm's investment in working
capital (e.g., inventories, receivables, etc.). Peculiarities
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of the tax laws can be a source of residual value that must
be taken into account in a lease versus buy decision.
Capital losses can be taken for tax purposes when a piece
of equipment or a building is sold or scrapped before the
end of its IRS approved write-off period. Thus, capital
losses for tax purposes can produce tax credits that are
just as much a part of a project's cash flow as are the
direct proceeds from the sale of the facilities themselves.
From the above samples, the correct conclusion is that what
matters in regards to terminal value for the lease versus
buy decision is the case value at the end of the asset's
economic life. However, if the terminal value does indeed
not influence materially the investment worth of a capital
decision, there is no practical gain to be had for measuring
2that value.
In an article entitled "Residual Values in Investment
Analysis" by Gordon Shillinglaw appearing in Ezra Solomon's
The Management of Corporate Capital , the following proposi-
tions were proposed regarding terminal value, economic life,
3tax life, and/or annual earnings.
a. If the tax writeoff is in line with the life time
decline in the resale value of the original investment,
residual values have little effect on rate of return.
b. If these two variables are not in line, residual
values can have a major influence on the investment deci-
sion, provided that economic life is short and/or the
minimum cutoff rate is low.
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c. When economic life is long (e.g., ten years or
longer) and the company's minimum cutoff rate is high
(e.g./ 20 percent or higher), the effect of the residual
value on the investment decision is likely to be limited
to borderline projects.
d. When economic life is short and/or when the minimum
cutoff rate is low, residual values will have a broader
range of influence, and estimates should be made.
e. When the minimum cutoff rate is high and economic
life is long, the rate and level of the tax writeoff has
a far greater impact on investment worth than is made by
residual value.
From the above mentioned points, it behooves the lease
contracting parties to write their contracts with a decision
that examines an allowance for a terminal value which could
alter the required lease payments in favor of the lessee.
Thus, careful negotiations of the terms of a lease can
overcome the disadvantage of loss of title, unless major
capital gains are very certain.
Estimating terminal values is a very difficult task,
but if terminal values are deemed influential in the
investment decision, the task must be addressed. The most
frequent excuse in disregarding terminal value is that ade-
quate data is not available. It is true that many firms
do not have routine reporting systems in which a flow of
data is in a readily usable form. Also of consideration is
the fact that many estimates can not be based completely

on data that is produced as a by-product of the noirmal
historical record of transactions. However, estimates
should be made although it is generally understood that
precision will not be achieved. To be remembered here is
that great precision is not necessary because fairly sub-
stantial error ranges in the estimates of terminal values
can be tolerated because of the effect of time on present
value in our lease versus buy decision.
Although historical data can be used, the decision maker
must be forward-looking. The relevance to the future must
be evaluated. Past accounting records are generally most
useful in estimating the resale values of plant and equip-
ment. For example, each piece of equipment gives rise to
a set of information relative to resale price and removal.
Thus, this type flow of information can be systematized
to lay the foundation for future estimates. Of interest to
the decision maker are firm and quasi public sources which
specialize in surveys of asset terminal values. In some
cases terminal value curves can be derived from some of the
currently available published special surveys.
Before closing this chapter, it is prudent to address
one further argument that is advanced as a justification for
ignoring or sharply discounting future residual values.
This argument states that conservatism dictates that the
future is so difficult to predict that the prudent investor
should assume the worst possible scenario, that is, assume
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terminal value to be zero. To counter this argument, we
must remember that a policy of ignoring terminal value is
not truly a conservative policy. Instead, a conservative
policy should attempt to maintain and increase the value
of the firm. An objective appraisal of risks and a willing-
ness to go forward is necessary when opportunities for gains
outweigh risk of loss. Ignoring terminal value in the
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In the lease versus buy decision, there are, perhaps,
many possible outcomes. Business uncertainty or risk
links the investment of capital in a project with the hope
of profit or the possibility of loss. There would be in
any investment decision a range of possible outcomes.
Examining the characteristics of this range introduces the
dimension of risk.
For example a decision maker in estimating the costs
or benefits of a cash flow for a particular period would
establish a mean or average outcome of that cash flow.
He would also establish an upper and lower limit to his most
probable value. Curve probabilities could then be charted
in some sort of distribution - most likely some type of
normal distribution. (See Figure 7-1.) The difference
between curve one and two is that the latter is more risky
than the former in that the cash flow varies over a greater
range. However, both curves reflect the same expected
value. This value is the mean of each outcome weighted by
its probability of outcome.
From the above one notes that an investment decision
should require a central tendency as well as a distribution
of other possible outcomes. Statistics can provide the
decision maker with a measure of that distribution with




Typical Curves of Probabilities"
Dollars

calculated if we have adequate data for the analysis, and
the outcomes are distributed normally. The standard
deviation, thus can produce a number that gives a range
around the mean within which a certain percentage of the
outcomes will fall. The higher the standard deviation, the
wider the range necessary to obtain the desired percentage
of observations and, thus, the higher the risk.
If one then wishes to compare alternatives and since
the standard deviation is expressed in an absolute number,
convert the standard deviation into a relative number by
dividing the standard deviation by the mean to which it is
related. This is called the coefficient of variation.
Although the above would indicate a relatively straight
forward method of determining the riskiness of a project
that is available, real life situations complicate the
process. The statistics become very complex when dealing
with a time series of related outcomes and a consideration
of interrelated investments. This statistical expertise
will probably not be necessary for our eventual methodology
as will be explained later.
However, if one were to persevere in his analysis using
these statistical methods, the biggest problem would proba-
bly occur in the data base for the calculations. Few
businesses have the historical cost-revenue relationships
with which the distributions could be built. The highly
competitive environment prevents the accumulation of
repetitive experiences necessary for the analysis.
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Hunt, Williams, and Donaldson's Basic Business Finance
state two solutions to the above problem. One solution is
to substitute judgmental probabilities for historical proba-
bilities. A Delphi technique is conducted with the resultant
probabilities used to build a probability distribution.
The problems with this method is that although a decision
maker may be comfortable with a higher and lower bound to
an outcome, the intervening points may remain unconvincing
to him. Even if we assume normality in our distribution,
refined application on risk may be unwarranted if
a. the investment decision in question is of major
consequence and the risk and return differences are small.
b. the risk and return differences are large, a full
description of the probability curve may be unnecessary.
The second solution is the use of a computer model of
the variable to simulate the environment. The resulting
data could be used to build probability distributions in
order to compare risk. The major problem is the large
amount of time and money necessary to conduct such a program.
At present only a few large companies are working on this
application. Until computer assisted financial analysis
becomes widespread, decision makers will probably use rough
yet easier approaches.
In everyday practice businesses give no explicit account
for risk in their capital budgeting decisions. However, if
differences were substantial and apparent, a subjective
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analysis is done. Most firms use a cost of capital rate
or discount rate to reflect not only their cost of debt
and equity but also their risk level of the business. Also
of note is the fact that if a risk level of a particular
project is different from the norm, an adjustment to the
hurdle rate is made, often, as stated above, subjectively.
Some firms use multiple hurdle rates reflecting differ-
ent risk categories. In a multidivision firm, each division
would have a different hurdle rate depending on the risk
level of that division. The same rationale can be used
among the different product lines of a multiproduct firm.
Each product represents a different risk level and is
reflected as such by a different hurdle rate. However, a
key point to be made from the above is that the decision
maker should not use a different hurdle rate just for one
element of a product line, division, market area, etc., but
that the decision should encompass a careful risk analysis
of the financial changes resulting from major strategic
2
choices m the use of corporate resources.
The application of a single risk adjusted discount rate
to all individual projects in the firm is, as implied before,
widely accepted by private firms although theoretically
weak. The key assumption here is that the characteristics
of the individual projects do not change the average risk
level of the firm. However, in the case of a firm which
must choose among investment opportunities with inherent

risks that do change the average risk level of the firm,
Haim Le'^/y ' s and Marshall Sarnat ' s Investment and Portfolio
Analysis suggest the follov/ing procedure:
a. In the first stage the future cash flows
of all projects are reduced to a common
denominator by calculating their present
values . . . The appropriate discount rate
is the riskless rate of interest.
b. After adjusting for the time value of
money, the estimated "market price" of a
unit risk is used to find the optimal
combination.
^
A government project's risk or procurement strategy's
risk, such as lease versus buy, is similar to a firm's risk.
Examples here would be weapons systems that do not work as
predicted and canals that become abandoned before antici-
pated. Thus, one could not say that a government project
with a return on investment of nine percent should be equal
to a private firm's rate of return of, say, fifteen percent
on a similar project because of implied differences in the
risk allowances of the participants. However, several
economists have argued that because the government takes on
so many investment projects in the economy, these projects
incur no risk on the principle of the law of large numbers
-
This method is the same principle that a life insurance
company works upon when the company does not know when an
individually insured policy-holder will die. This last
premise seems logical and very workable in an approach
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VIII. TWO GENERAL EXAMPLES OF THE LEASE VERSUS
BUY DECISION IN INDUSTRY AND GOVERNMENT
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the lease
versus buy decisions for two major transactions, one from
industry and one from government. The proponent's arguments
as to the transaction assumptions will be set forth to
demonstrate the elements of the final decision and to give
the reader an insight into the actual application of the
previous chapters ' discussions in the lease versus buy
decision.
The first case concerns Anaconda Company's lease of an
aluminum mill in 1973. Anaconda built the mill and then
negotiated a lease through U.S. Leasing International. The
1971 Chilean mines' seizure by the Allende Government created
a tax loss of nearly $360 million. Therefore, if Anaconda
had chosen to own the plant, the investment tax credit and
the depreciation tax advantage would have been of no immediate
value. The salvage value was perceived to be negligible
after an assumed twenty year period life span. In calculating
the value of lease over purchase, the most difficult task
was to find the right discount rate. Since this lease was
a leveraged one, i.e., part of the $110.7 million for the
cost of the plant was raised from three insurance companies
to a total of $72 million, 9.125 percent was negotiated with
the insurance companies for their contribution. This value
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was then assumed by Anaconda to be its cost of capital and
used as its hurdle rate after assuring itself that this
would have been the rate the company would have had to pay
to completely finance the plant by bonds. On a semi-annual
basis, the rate is 4.56 percent. Over a twenty year life
with the extreme assumption that no taxes would have to
be paid for the next twenty years, the only liability
created by the lease contract would be the present value
of the lease payments themselves, $84,792 million. The
present value to Anaconda is then $110.7 - $84.8 = $25.9
million. The effective rate on the lease was 5.542 percent."
Forgotten, of course, in the above Anaconda analysis
is the fact that some of the depreciation tax shields could
have been carried forward and eventually used if Anaconda
had bought the plant. On the other hand, once Anaconda
starts paying taxes , the cash outlay for lease payments
declines by half. However, Anaconda probably forsaw this
possibility in that the first twentyone payments were
$3,985,034 each and the last nineteen were $5,460,278 each.
Even with the above items taken into consideration. Anaconda
made a substantial net present value gain given the reason-
2
able forecasts made at the time of the contract.
The above example was a classical case whereby a company
perceived that by leasing, it would be able to pass on the
tax benefits it could not use. A lessor who could use the
tax benefits would in turn give a good deal on the lease
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rate which could terminate in an interest rate well below
the company's long term rate. The risk to Anaconda is
that the company could become profitable earlier than
predicted. The lease decision could then prove to be the
more expensive decision and, consequently, the company
3 4
could be locked into an uneconomic deal for a long time. '
The second case concerned the Navy's leasing of trans-
port ships in 1974 rather than buying these ships outright.
The lease, or charter, extended over a period of twenty
years in v/hich payments from the government to the investors
occur annually. In essence the government signed a contract
stating that the government would lease a ship that a ship-
yard built. This government obligation is used by the
contractor to secure short-term funds for construction.
Once the contractor delivered the ship to the Navy, long-
term financing was substituted for the short-term construc-
tion loans. These loans are usually through the sale of
bonds to institutional lenders, leasing companies, and
commercial banks.
The Navy contended that the build and lease program
was less expensive than outright purchase because the cash
outflows were discounted based on the government's ten
percent present value of money. The lease was properly
structured so that a greater proportion of cash was paid
during the earlier years. The Navy then calculated that the
combined effect of the lease option was to yield an effective
interest rate of 5.961 percent. This value compared

favorably with a twentyfive year bond issued by the
Treasury at seven percent. The advantage to the owners
in this transaction was the use of the accelerated depre-
ciation range of a ship using either double declining
balance or sum of digits method. These methods resulted
in large amounts of depreciation against other income.
The tax deferrals were set aside in a sinking fund and
invested until it is time to pay the deferred taxes. The
lease companies and banks also are repaid their investment
plus a fixed rate of return on that investment. The bond-
holders received payment of their bonds plus the agreed
upon rate of interest. Finally, the shipbuilder made his
6 4profit on the actual construction of the ship. '
The specific advantages of lease in this case are the
following.
a. By proper structuring the charter hire to
defer the bulk of the payments as long as
possible, there is a substantial economic
saving to the government.
b. It enables the Government to secure the
use of new ships on credit and without any
large outlay of funds
.
c. The Government does not pay any charter
hire until the ship is ready for use.
d. It spreads the cost of the ship over the
life of the ship.
e. The financial restrictions and the use
of a fixed price ship construction contract
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IX. CURRENT LEASE VERSUS BUY POLICY FOR THE
PROCUREMENT OF OFFICE COPYING EQUIPMENT
The Army sets forth its policy in regards to the pur-
chase of office copying equipment through several sets of
regulations. These regulations specify the criteria that a
using agency must utilize in making the operational and
financial decision as to whether to procure an office copier.
Because the operational decision would be of no consequence
in the lease versus buy decision, the following discusses
only the financial aspects of the transaction assuming that
an army agency decided it needed a copier.
Department of the Army Technical Bulletin, TB AG 4,
Office Copying Equipment , states that in the rental versus
purchase decision, the decision maker is to amortize pur-
chased equipment within two years. This result would then
show benefits of a year or two more. The assumption here
is that an office copier would last no more than four years
from date of the procurement. The following simplified
formula is suggested.
a. Subtract the monthly maintenance contract
cost from the monthly rental.
b. Divide the remainder into the purchase
price of the machine. The answer is the
number of months it will take for the pur-
chase price to equal the amount which would
be spent for rental. At this point, the
machine can be said to have been paid for,
and the copy cost would thereafter be limited
to the cost of supplies and maintenance. -*

United States Forces Command (FORSCOM) and United States
Training and Doctrine Command (TRM)OC) have each issued
current supplements to regulations on copier procurement
policies to their respective commands. The TRADOC supplement
specifically says that "Purchase of copiers will be restricted
to those instances where break-even/payback period can be
2
realized m five years or less ... . " The FORSCOM supplement
says essentially the same thing with the following addition.
If funds are not available for purchase,
it is recommended that purchase be programmed
for the next fiscal year and rent the copier
for the remainder of the current fiscal year.
When funds become available, apply the
"option to purchase" terms towards reducing
the original purchase price. -^
Interviews were conducted at Fort Ord, California to
observe the actual implementation of the aforementioned
directives. The person in charge of procurement at Fort
Ord relied upon the financial analysis done by the highest
headquarters of the user agency, either TRADOC or FORSCOM.
The FORSCOM decision maker made his lease versus buy deci-
sion based solely on the cash flow which yielded the smallest
monthly cost over a five year period. In reality this method
was a payback analysis in which depreciation was considered
a monthly "charge". This individual was rewarded on the
cents per copy criteria in that the smaller this figure the
better his rating. Thus, if a purchased machine was fully
depreciated after a five year period and was still opera-
tional (which was usually the case) , the overall cents per
copy cost would be very small. In summary, then, the

decision was first to choose the copier make and model by
lowest purchase price and, separately, decide whether to
purchase or least it.
The decision maker at the TRADOC agency at Fort Ord
followed the payback criteria provided by the regulation.
Of note is that his justification to the commander also
would involve a net present value criteria to justify v/hether
a chosen machine would be financed by a lease or purchase
transaction. The decision maker preferred the payback cri-
teria in that he found that a non-financial oriented commander
was more attuned to a payback criteria than a NPV criteria.
Again, in any case, the decision as to which copier was to
be selected depended upon the purchase price with the deci-
sion to lease or purchase a separate step. The lease versus
buy decision was also heavily influenced by the amount of
money available for the fiscal year in that if a machine
was perceived to be needed and funds were short for the
year, a lease would be established with a later option to
purchase in the following year. The financial advantages
of this type of transaction are never analyzed as to type
of machine to procure and to the extra cost, if any, that
would be involved over a straight purchase.
All prices for copying equipment and related services
are standardized by the General Services Administration
Federal Supply Schedule Price List . These prices are nego-
tiated by a centralized contract that covers all equipment
that a vendor offers for sale in a given year. These prices

are then used by procurement officers at major installations
to decide what machinery to procure and whether lease
versus buy is in their best interest. Note that if the
prices have already been negotiated as to lease costs and
purchase costs, the decision has already been made whether
a using unit should lease or purchase, assuming ample fiscal
year funds are available, based on the regulations' use
of the payback criteria.
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California, 28 September 1978.
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The following is a general description of a lease
versus buy methodology of a system using the procurement
of an office copier by the Army as a vehicle for demonstra-
tion. Of course, this proposed method could be used for
any number of systems in which the Army has a choice of
lease or buy.
The analysis of need for a system should involve the
normal operational analysis as to its increase in efficiency
versus cost in the organization. The final choices should
include, as examples,
a. do nothing
b. purchase system A
c. lease system A
d. purchase system B
e. lease system B
f. etc.
for every how-many choices are available to the decision
maker. These final choices should be screened only as to
regulations involving environmental constraints such as Buy
American legislation, availability of maintenance, etc.
Assume also that the decision maker would consider only
alternatives that closely met his needs. This latter assump-
tion implies that he would not wish to consider a larger
capability than he anticipated and, thus, unduly compare a
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larger yet costlier system with a smaller yet cheaper
system that met his needs. In essence the decision making
process is a combined one in which all aspects of cost
including the method of financing is done in one single step.
This approach is contrary to the present method (as outlined
in chapter IX in the example of a copier) of choosing a
system first and determining the finance arrangements second.
Instead/ all costs should be outlined and summed for each
alternative. The lowest cost would be the optimal choice.
The lease versus buy model that best contributes to the
above process is the Bower, Herringer, and Williamson model.
(See chapter IV. ) This method takes into consideration
the lease-loan decision. Because the government does not
pay taxes, the third, fourth, and fifth terms are always
zero. Also, the Army does not concern itself with the
investment tax credit. Thus, the eighth term is zero. The
copiers that the Army uses have negligible terminal value
and thus, the seventh term can be considered zero for the
copier example.
A„, the first term, is the total purchase price of the
n
system. The second term, J R./d+r) , is the sum of the
i=l ^
discounted lease payments . The r value to which the lease
payments are discounted represents the interest rate on
the non-cancellable claims that apply to debt. The best
estimate of this value would then be the long-term treasury
bond rate, currently eight percent. r should represent the
riskless rate because the funds are used to finance government
72

projects as explained in chapter VII. The sixth term,
n O^(l-t)
I T-, is the discounted operational payments if the
i=l(l+K.)^
t n
r ipurchase decision is made. This term reduces to / 0./(l+K.
)
i=l ^
because the tax rate, t, is considered zero. The discount
rate, K , represents a weighted average cost of capital for
government. This figure measures the operating advantage
of the lease compared to a rate of return at which taxpayers
could use these funds. As explained in the latter part of
chapter four, fifteen percent is probably a good current
estimate for this figure. The final formula for the model
to the lease versus buy question is as follows.
^
^0. (1-t)
NAL = A - 5; R./(l+r)^ + I -^
.=1 i^i'i^'^t'
whereby if NAL is positive, lease is more desirable, and
if NAL is negative, purchase is more desirable. Periodically
the government should publish the K and r rates to be used
in lease versus buy decisions in government procurement if
the above formula were to be used.
Using just one particular copier, Xerox 3107, as an
example to the above explanation, note the difference and
magnitude of the NAL values in lease versus buy decisions
as the above method is compared with the current payback
criteria.

^0 original cost + installation - 3j% , 30 days,
net thereafter
= $7885 + $37 - .035($7885 + $37) = $7715
R. = $205 - .035($205) = $198
O^ = $65 - .035($65) = $63
Also, subtract a one time charge of $110 for installation
and removal of rental equipment. Note also that a discount
of 32-%/ 30 days, net thereafter is incorporated into the
calculations as specified in the GSA negotiated price list.
The payback criteria in the current regulations yields
57.1 months until the machine is paid off. We would thus
purchase rather than lease because 57.1 months is less than
the 60 month cutoff specified by regulation. (See figure
10-1.)
Using the Bower, Herringer, and Williamson model for
several different conditions yields the results in figure
10-2. As a baseline, calculations show the result when
no discounting is used. The ranges for both r and K were
used to show results for realistic values that would occur
in a changing economy. The five year period is demonstrated
because of its mention in the current regulations. Inter-
views indicated that copiers lasted longer than five years.




R. - 0. = $198/mo. - $63/mo. = $135/mo,
AQ/$135/mo. = $7715/$135/mo. = 57.1 mo.
See chapter IX for detailed explanation of payback criteria
for copiers.
Figure 10-2
YEARS r \ NAL RESULT
5 0% 0% $-495 purchase
5 6% 10% $319 lease
5 8% 15% $480 lease
5 10% 20% $653 lease
8 0% 0% $-5355 purchase
8 6% 10% $-3337 purchase
8 8% 15% $-2922 purchase
8 10% 20% $-2483 purchase
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to determine the mean lifetime of a copier in a command and
use this value as his life span for consideration. Both
five and eight year life spans are shown for comparison
purposes only. The payback period seems to be a close
approximation in this case and would be a rough guide if
indeed the Army planned to keep their copiers more than
five years. Because this fact is not explicitly stated,
the Bower, Herringer , and Williams model, with the stated
assumed values, would seem to be a more reasonable method.
Also, the payback period method implies a two step decision
making process which can not be combined with an overall
cost effectiveness analysis to yield a single value for the
system.
The resulting NAL value for each candidate system would
determine if that system were to be purchased or leased.
The cheaper financial arrangement would then be calculated
for actual cost inclusion into the cost-benefit analysis
of the system. Note that whether lease or buy were chosen
for the candidate system, the same assumptions should be
applied as they were in the NAL calculation. The result
is that when all competing systems are comapred against each
other, a one step decision, which already included the
financing method, can be determined.
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Supply Schedule Price List for Copy Equipment, Supplies
and Services, Purchase of Machines, Accessories, Supplies,
Rental, Repair and Maintenance, Xerox Corporation,
contract GS-OOS-45190 for the period of October 1, 1977
through September 30, 1978.
2Present value calcualted using present value of $1/12
received monthly for N years. Using annual tables will




A lease versus buy methodology for Army procurement
in which lease is assumed to be a viable alternative to
purchase can be expressed as follows.
1. Assign all recurring costs into operating costs,
if the purchase decision were to be made, and lease
payments, if the lease decision were to be made.
2. Establish a single purchase price if purchase were
to be the final decision in procurement.
3. Establish a realistic salvage value, if applicable,
for the end of the anticipated life span.
4. Assume tax payments and the tax credit to be zero
for government projects.
5. Use the lump sum model as set forth in chapter X.
6. Discount lease payments to the current long term
Treasury bond rate.
7. Discount the terminal value and operating costs to
the weighted average of capital for government which repre-
sents the operating advantage of the lease compared to
a rate of return at which the private sector could use these
funds. Currently, fifteen percent is a good figure as
explained in chapter IV.
8. Calculate the NAL which will determine whether the
lease or buy option is the cheaper method to financing
the system.

9. Conduct the overall cost-benefit analysis of the
system assuming the cheaper financing alternative is to
be used. Insure the same assumptions are applied to this
step as they were to the step eight NAL calculation.
10. Make the final decision as to which system to






The following is a short summary of areas in the govern-
ment lease versus buy decision that demand further study.
a. Should a government agency be allowed to lease as
an alternative to issuing debt? Private industry considers
lease contracts as debt and, as previously mentioned, is
so reflected in the firm's annual financial statements.
However, each government agency down to local managers of
specific government units are allowed to make the lease/
purchase decision. They, then, can be considered to be
making a debt financing decision. The question is whether
or not Congress consciously desires that local managers
assume responsibility for taking on new debt by way of
leasing - a function normally and explicitly given to Congress
b. Should the GAO use a different approach wherein
each command should be allowed to make its own cost of
capital? As noted in the current lease versus buy decisions,
the amount of the discount rate plays an important role in
the final outcome. Implied in an agency chief deciding one
project out ot many with a limited budget is his "gut-feel"
discount rate which produces his final decision. This
implied rate may not be explicit when the final decision is
made but could be computed after the final outcome. The
advantage to this approach is that one could say that the
chief is the best man to know his own organization and

consequently is the best person to assess its needs. The
disadvantages are
(1) that a uniform decision making process is not
used and consequently could not be justified to a cost
conscious Congress
(2) and that local discount rates do not guarantee
the best use of available resources throughout the
government.
As seen from the above, both questions are not totally
resolved and need further study.
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